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A short preliminary study has been undertaken of the possible issues relating 
to future environmental governance in Scotland post-Brexit.  The expert group 
involved in making the assessments included in this report has focused on 
PDLQWDLQLQJ6FRWODQG¶VJOREDOSRVLWLRQDVDOHDGHULQHQYLURQPHQWDO
governance and performance.  Whilst much may depend on UK:EU 
negotiations and arrangements provided and agreed with the UK in due 
course, and much remains uncertain at this point2, consideration is given 
GLUHFWO\WR6FRWODQG¶VSROLF\DQGJRYHUQDQFHQHHGVDQGto the main issues 
arising.  Key areas where there is a risk of disadvantage without intervention 
concern access to expertise in professional policy and practice networks, 
access to skills and the value of oversight mechanisms provided by the 
Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) around verifying 
compliance with and enforcement of environmental law.  Options for retaining 
membership of professional networks and securing appropriate oversight 
mechanisms are considered. 
 
1 Mission and Scope/Remit 
1.1 The scope for this Report and the work of the sub-group was set out in 
terms of reference (annex 1).  It VKRXOG³FRQVLGHUDQGSURYLGHDGYLFHLQ
response to the following questions:   
1. What potential gaps may arise, if any, in existing powers to monitor and 
enforce environmental standards in Scotland, should the UK exit the 
EU on terms which result in the loss of oversight of the CJEU and the 
European Commission? 
2. Where gaps are identified, what options are there for providing 
appropriate levels of scrutiny, reporting and accountability in Scotland 
on environmental matters? 
For each option proposed, please identify: 
a. The international comparators that have been considered in developing 
the option; 
                                                        
1
 Members of the Round Table who form the subgroup are Lloyd Austin, Dr. Antonio Cardesa-  
Salzmann, Prof. Campbell Gemmell (Ch.), Jonny Hughes and Dr. Annalisa Savaresi. The 
subgroup co-opted Professor Colin Reid as a member.  Additional support was provided by 
Bridget Marshall (SEPA), and Dr. Ian Jardine, Kate Thomson-McDermott and Keith Evans 
from Scottish Government as well as Isobel Mercer from RSPB and Professor Elisa Morgera.  
2
 The work was carried out largely in February and March. Editing and updating was 
undertaken in May. The Defra Environmental Governance consultation - 
https://consult.defra.gov.uk/eu/environmental-principles-and-governance/ - emerged as the 
final document was being produced. 
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b. Any adjustments that would be required to the powers and functions of 
existing bodies to address identified gaps; 
c. If any options have been identified that cannot be implemented through 
changes to the powers and functions of existing bodies and a new 
body is proposed, please set out clearly its proposed scope and 
powers; and 
d. The way in which arrangements within the option proposed at a 
Scottish level might relate to the fulfilment of international 
FRPPLWPHQWV´ 
1.2 7KHJURXSDFFHSWHGWKLV³EULHI´ZKLOVWDFNQRZOHGJLQJIURPWKHRXWVHWLWV
ambitious nature, challenging timetable and serious conditional uncertainties 
around the EU/UK/Scotland dimensions of the Brexit negotiation and 
development process. 
1.3 The report which follows is set out in the following sections: WKHUHSRUW¶V 
remit, method of work and assessment; the main points emerging from a 
systematic analysis of policy areas, including identification of common issues 
and exceptions, as well as the most concerning potential losses, gaps or 
weaknesses post-Brexit; possible solutions and options for consideration; and 
final recommendations.  This report is not the definitive work in this area but 
aims to offer a brief initial professional assessment by experienced 
practitioners, subject specialists and lawyers.  We hope it is useful in guiding 
the way forward to stronger future governance. 
 
2 MO and methods used 
2.1 The work of the group for this report builds on the previous work of the 
Round Table and was undertaken following an initial scoping meeting on 19 
January 2018 primarily through three working meetings (2 February, 6 and 13 
March) and correspondence principally during February and early March.  We 
also acknowledge the value and utility of a range of resources3, including:  
UKELA¶Vreport series on µBrexit and Environmental Law¶4; RSPB Scotland¶V
unpublished discussion paper on the opportunities for strengthening 
enforcement of environmental laws in Scotland; the SULNE Report edited by 
                                                        
3
 Study to assess the benefits delivered through the enforcement of EU environmental 
legislation - 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pubs/pdf/Final_report_study_benefits_enforcement.pdf  
The number of formal infringement cases involving the UK are detailed at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/national_factsheet_united-
kingdom_2016_en_0.pdf  and the number of environmental complaints across the EU is 
shown at the link ± see p.24 of http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=SWD%3A2017%3A259%3AFIN&from=EN  
4
 The following UKELA reports were considered:  
x  Enforcement and Accountability Issues ± July 2017  
x  Exit from the Euratom Treaty and its Environmental Implications ± July 2017  
x  Brexit, Henry VIII Clauses and Environmental Law ± September 2017  
x  The UK and International Environmental Law after Brexit ± September 2017, including 
the so-called Scottish Annex (unpublished)  
x  The UK and European Co-operation Bodies ± January 2018  
x  Environmental Standard Setting after Brexit ± February 2018  
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Cardesa-Salzman and Savaresi5; and GreenHU8.¶VUHSRUWRQµThe 
Governance Gap¶6 in shaping our consideration and findings. 
2.2 The group developed a framework approach to assess the governance 
status and issues across areas of environmental law.  The following areas 
were considered: 
Nature Conservation and Biodiversity 
Air Pollution Emissions, Transboundary Pollution and Climate Change 
issues 
Environmental Impact, Access to Environmental Information and 
Environmental Justice 
Marine Environment 
Nuclear and radioactivity issues 
Waste and Circular Economy 
Water environment and Flooding 
Chemicals, biocides and pesticides 
General Governance 
2.3 These areas were mapped against current legislative and governance 
arrangements, focusing on what happens and needs to happen at the 
Scottish level, when and if EU-level arrangements are removed.  Hence, we 
considered the policy issues in summary terms in the following ways, first: 
International framework and existing governance  
European framework and existing governance   
Any UK framework and existing governance, where possible indicating 
if these were established and operated through legislation, MoU or 
other administrative arrangement between UK nations. 
Any Scottish framework and existing governance arrangements  
For each policy area we also soughWWRFDSWXUHNH\³RWKHU´LVVXHV, including 
connections with other policy areas as well as relevant financial and political 
considerations. 
It was also acknowledged that the level at which governance was 
operationalized was important. For example, there could be a requirement to 
report performance internationally but the data might be collected and 
reported at a devolved, UK or EU level. 
2.4 After completing this initial stage, we focused on identifying potential gaps, 
asking the following questions under each heading: 
Implementation of environmental law and policy. 
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Monitoring, measuring and reporting on the state of the environment  
x Will there be gaps in current DUUDQJHPHQWVIROORZLQJWKH8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH
EU? Consideration was also given to the review and reporting of 
information regarding both the state of the natural world and performance 
against policy objectives as well as the publication of such information. 
Checking compliance with environmental law and policy  
x Will there be gaps in processes and arrangements to check and ensure 
compliance with environmental law and policy that would result from the 
8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8" This included consideration of the ability of citizens 
and civil society organisations to raise complaints and/or seek 
investigations.    
Enforcing environmental law  
x :LOOWKH8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8UHVXOWLQJDSVWRDSSURSULDWHHQIRUFHPHQWRI
environmental law and policy to address any lapses in implementation 
and/or compliance, including the application of appropriate remedies and 
sanctions?  This included consideration of the ability of citizens and civil 
society organisations to request enforcement. 
Institutional co-operation 
x :LOOWKH8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8UHVXOWLQJDSVWKURXJKORVVRIDFFHVVWR
specialist co-operation bodies, networks and agencies relevant to 
environmental law? This included consideration of the loss of functions 
including the facilitation of cross-border co-operation, policy and best 
practice exchange as well as the development, implementation and 
enforcement of environmental law. 
 
3 Summary of Main Points (by Sector) 
3.1 Nature Conservation and Biodiversity 
3.1.1 The most important EU legislative provisions for nature are the Birds 
and Habitats Directives, and the Natura 2000 network of protected areas they 
FUHDWH7KHVHVLWDWWKHKHDUWRIWKH(8¶VDSSURDFKWRWDFNOLQJELRGLYHUVLW\ORVV
and have created a uniform and fairly prescriptive common framework for 
nature conservation across the EU Member States. The Natura 2000 sites 
are, however, the contribution of the EU and its member states to the Emerald 
network7 of protected areas under the Bern Convention. 
3.1.2 A raft of other EU Directives, regulations and institutions are also 
operational in this area; including MSFD (see marine section below), the EIA 
Directive (see below) and the Regulation on Invasive Non-Native Species 
(INNS)7KH(8¶VDSSURDFKWRELRGLYHUVLty conservation was founded on the 
principles of a common and coordinated approach to transboundary issues 





and to protect shared natural heritage, for instance migratory species and 
habitat conservation across biogeographical regions.  
3.1.3 On this basis, it is possible that ± in relation to the making of future laws 
in the UK - the EU will demand that the UK retains regulatory alignment in 
VRPHDUHDVUHOHYDQWWRELRGLYHUVLW\FRQVHUYDWLRQLQRUGHUWRSUHYHQWD³UDFHWR
WKHERWWRP´RQHQYLURQPHQWDOVWDQGDUds. These could include regulations on 
Invasive Non-Native Species and protection of migratory species among 
others. Future developments to EU laws in this area, such as updates to 
Schedules relating to protected species and habitats, will not be automatically 
reflected within domestic law, and a mechanism will be needed to review such 
changes and implement them where appropriate. 
3.1.4 The loss of EU institutions will create, or widen, a number of governance 
gaps relating to biodiversity conservation.  
3.1.5 The European Commission plays a key role in monitoring and reporting 
requirements for biodiversity and the Natura Network. Most of these functions 
are likely to fall to existing or new bodies within the UK, unless data are 
reported to an institution entirely independent of governments, resulting in a 
significant weakening of external scrutiny and accountability. A poor 
separation of powers in this area could affect, for instance, projects being 
consented within designated sites, the weight given to declining trends in 
biodiversity and scrutiny of derogations to the legislation on activities relating 
to protected species. 
3.1.6 The governance gaps for biodiversity conservation will be most 
prominent in relation to enforcement and compliance. The complaints 
mechanism provided by the European Commission has been heavily utilised 
by individuals and civil society organisations in the nature sector and the 
oversight of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has strongly incentivised 
compliance. The Directorate General for the Environment (DG ENV) reported 
an average (mean) of 79 infringements per annum in the nature sector 
between 2007 and 2016.8  The JNCC recorded 114 cases relating to the 
implementation of the Nature Directives in the UK, 18 of which were in 
Scotland.9 These figures give an indication of the level of oversight that EU 
institutions have played in checking compliance with environment laws 
relating to biodiversity and the types of compliance issues that could go 
unchecked in the absence of such oversight.  
3.1.7 Specialist EU bodies, agencies and working groups have played a 
strong role in supporting action in this area, particularly through biodiversity 
data collation which has allowed a comparison of biodiversity trends across 
the different Member States. This suggests that there may be capacity issues 
moving forward and that there is a need for continued collaboration between 
the Scotland/UK and some of these institutions. The most prominent EU body 
regarding this issue is the European Environment Agency (EEA) ± some form 
of working arrangements with the EEA and the rest of the EU will be 
necessary to compare biodiversity data between the UK and other MS, 
                                                        
8
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/pdf/statistics_sector_from_2007_to_2016.pdf  
9
 JNCC Catalogue of case law relating to articles of the EU Birds and Habitats Directives 
(2016 version), available at: http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-6780  
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especially on migratory species and Invasive Non-Native Species (INNS); 
tackle pressures on biodiversity across shared biogeographic regions; and 
maintain up-to-date lists for protected species and habitats.   
3.1.8 The EU &RPPLVVLRQ¶VUROHLQDJUHHLQJWKHDGHTXDF\DQGGLVWULEXWLRQRI
SACs, based on biogeographic/ecological factors (especially from a continent 
wide perspective), could be replaced by scientific expertise in a domestic 
scrutiny body ± this would provide validation for Government decisions as well 
as demonstrate our (former) Natura network was an appropriate contribution 
to the Emerald network.   However, the system can operate without replacing 
WKH(8&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUROHLQDSSURYLQJWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQZKHUHDSURject 
affecting a priority site falls outwith the narrow range of ordinarily approved 
overriding purposes; this would, though, mean that there will be no external 
scrutiny of government decisions. 
 
3.2 Atmosphere (Air Pollution and Climate Change, excluding Energy)  
3.2.1 In this area, the more obvious benefits of EU membership are that the 
8.KDVEHHQDEOHWRUHO\RQWKH(8¶Vlaw-making, governance arrangements, 
cooperation and support mechanisms (including the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme, ETS, and the Fluorinated Gases, F-gases, Registry), both to devise 
measures to reduce emissions and to scrutinise the implementation of these 
measures.  
3.2.2 As far as the making of law is concerned, after Brexit, formally the UK 
will no longer be required to align with EU law on air pollution and climate 
change. Nevertheless, EU law presently is the conduit through which the UK 
implements many of its international obligations in these subject areas, 
including under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The UK will therefore need to look 
carefully at how international obligations under air pollution and climate 
change treaties are implemented after Brexit10. The numerous instruments on 
Ozone Depleting Substances are a specific cause of concern and need to be 
looked at in greater detail to better understand the implications of Brexit in this 
complex and composite area. 
3.2.3 Though much will depend on ongoing negotiations between the EU and 
the UK, current EU governance arrangements in this subject area (including 
for example the EU ETS and the F-gases Registry) are unlikely to service the 
UK after Brexit. These arrangements therefore have to be replaced urgently to 
avoid a cliff edge.11 Both on ETS and F-gases, the adoption of a UK-wide 
approach, within devolved responsibilities would be desirable, both for 
                                                        
10
 Annalisa Savaresi, Evidence to the ECCLR Committee, Scottish Parliament (2018) 
available at: 
http://www.parliament.scot/S5_Environment/Inquiries/Annalisa_Savaresi_written_submission.
pdf and Annalisa Savaresi, Evidence submitted to the Environmental Audit Committee, UK 








efficiency ± given that all administrations will have to make up for the 
shortcomings associated with the demise of the EU ETS and F-gases 
Registry ± as well as expediency considerations ± given that Scotland is only 
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUDIDLUO\VPDOOSDUWRIWKH8.¶VHPLVVLRQVFRYHUHGE\WKH(8
ETS and F-gases Registry. 
3.2.4 After Brexit, some continued collaboration with EU cooperation 
institutions, such as the EEA, in order to enable benchmarking, peer-review 
and peer-pressure in relation to emissions quantification and reduction 
measures, would be desirable, though not indispensable.  
3.2.5 As far as the enforcement of law is concerned, general considerations 
raised in other subject areas apply here too. In addition, the implementation of 
air pollution standards both in Scotland and in the UK is an area where 
significant shortcomings already exist. This is therefore an area that needs to 
be carefully monitored and where specific remedies may be needed. 
3.2.6 Finally, even after Brexit, UK business exporting to the EU will be under 
pressure to continue aligning with EU standards concerning products, for 
example on emissions from vehicles.  
 
3.3 Environmental Impact, Access to Environmental Information and 
Environmental Justice 
Environmental assessment 
3.3.1 Environmental assessment (EA) is the collective name for various 
statutory processes that inform decision makers about the likely significant 
environmental impact of a proposed decision, plan or strategy.  In itself, EA 
does not determine the decision. Rather, a range of statutory procedures are 
in place which require decision-makers to remain informed of, and take into 
account, the results of EA before a decision is made or a plan or strategy 
adopted. 
3.3.2 Where this is not already the case, most EU-derived EA legislation will, 
in the first instance, be converted into domestic law by the proposed 
European Union (Withdrawal) or Scottish Continuity Acts.  
3.3.3 In relation to SEA (the assessment of plans, policies and proposals), 
Scotland has deliberately and purposely legislated beyond the requirements 
of the relevant EU Directive. This leadership on SEA could be curbed if any 
newly developed common framework constrains any of the UK nations from 
going above and beyond requirements. 
3.3.4 A major loss of European Commission functions would, as with many 
areas, mainly relate to monitoring and reporting ± both on standards but also 
co-ordinating cross-border issues.   
3.3.5 However, the most significant loss will be enforcement and upholding 
compliance. The loss of access to the European Commission complaints 
mechanism will substantially reduce the ability of individuals and civil society 
organisations to request action where they believe EA has not been properly 
carried out. Furthermore the loss of CJEU oversight ± representing a threat of 
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enforcement and possible financial penalties ± is likely to weaken the 
incentives across the UK for ensuring that EA laws are complied with. 
3.3.6 As with many other areas explored in this report, some form of 
continued cooperation or working arrangement with EU institutions, agencies 
and working groups ± most notably the EEA ± is desirable in order to ensure 
continued best-practice sharing and comparison of data on transboundary 
projects. However participation in these groups is not a fundamental 
requirement to ensuring functionality in this area.  
Environmental justice (including Access to environmental information, Public-
participation in decision-making, Access to justice in environmental matters) 
3.3.7 While many aspects of this issue are non-legislative, especially the 
public participation process, the Aarhus Convention is the overarching 
international treaty that addresses these matters.  
3.3.8 Some of the requirements of the Convention are transposed into EU 
Directives and regulations. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act or the 
Scottish Continuity Bill will convert all existing EU legislation in this area into 
domestic law, but questions remain about how this legislation will be 
safeguarded from inadequately scrutinised amendments in the future and 
whether a provision will be implemented to remain in step with EU law in this 
area. For instance, the Commission does not currently monitor compliance 
with Pillar 3 (Access to Justice) of the Aarhus Convention, but this may 
change if the recent Commission Notice on Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters is accorded weight. If these issues are not addressed 
then the UK could be more out of step with the EU in regards to its Aarhus 
compliance, which as discussed below is already criticised by eNGOs. 
3.3.9 The UK and EU report separately to UNECE on the implementation of 
Aarhus requirements, so no monitoring and reporting gap will arise here.  
However, in the view of some stakeholders, Defra-led reports on behalf of the 
ZKROH8.WHQGWREHVSDUVHLQUHJDUGWRGHYROYHGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQV¶
implementation.  
3.3.10 The view of the UK and Scottish Governments is that all jurisdictions in 
WKH8.DUH³LQFRPSOLDQFH´EXWWKHH1*2VEHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHLVDOUHDG\Dgap 
in the implementation of the requirements of the Aarhus Convention, both in 
the UK and in Scotland, particularly regarding Pillar III - Access to Justice.  A 
recent ruling of the ACCC12 $DUKXV&RQYHQWLRQ¶V&RPSOLDQFH&RPPLWWHHRQ
SURKLELWLYHH[SHQVHVXSSRUWVWKHH1*2V¶SHUVSHFWLYHZKLOHD
communication13 that will lead to a ruling on substantive legality has been 
accepted14.  








 The sub-group would note that following a consultation last year, the Scottish Civil Justice 
Council (SCJC) have established a working group to consider the policy issues emerging 
IURPWKH6&-&¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQRQGUDIWUXOHVIRU3URWHFWLYH([SHQVHV2UGHUVDQGPDNH
recommendations to the Council for revised procedural rules to strengthen that protective 
system.   
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3.3.11 Access to justice in environmental matters is seen by environmental 
LQWHUHVWVDVDQµDWULVN¶DUHDZLWKLQWKLVWRSLFWhile the UK will remain 
signatory to the Aarhus Convention and existing EU legislation in this area will 
be carried forward,  the loss of the European Commission and European 
Parliament functions discussed above, as well as access to the CJEU 
represent a potentially significant narrowing of the scope to challenge 
Government on these issues over the longer term. Unless some of these 
functions are replicated in a domestic context then the ability of individuals 
and civil society organisations to make their voices heard on environmental 
matters will be substantially reduced. This could be addressed through 
amending the procedures of existing institutions or pursuing a number of new 
institutions 
 
3.4 Marine Environment 
3.4.1 We have not at this stage been able to carry out an extensive analysis 
of marine environment issues. The situation is more complicated because of 
the executive nature of the devolution of powers beyond 12 nautical miles.  
3.4.2 In many policy areas, the same considerations apply to the marine 
environment as to other environments, for example in relation to the 
provisions of the EU Nature Directives and international conventions such as 
the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. 
Therefore, for protected areas there may well be the same issues as those 
mentioned in relation to terrestrial and freshwater environments. There are 
however additional, specific aspects that will need to be considered to be 
addressed, such as future policy on implementation of the measures in the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive, as well as how marine and 
freshwater/terrestrial processes interact (e.g. Water Framework Directive 
coastal waters). These are not considered in detail here. Nor have we 
attempted to consider the many complex issues that will arise from EU 
withdrawal in relation to marine fisheries, which are subject to consideration 
by others including the marine and seafood stakeholders group. 
3.4.3 There are specific transboundary considerations to be taken into 
account for marine protected areas, which are the result of both EU and 
international law obligations. Specific legal instruments and agreements would 
come within the scope of any consideration of GHYROYHGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQV¶
µHQYLURQPHQWDOGXWLHV¶DQGZKHUHDQ\QHZDUUDQJHPHQWVWRDOORZVFUXWLQ\RU
challenge would apply. International obligations are particularly significant 
here, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
$WODQWLFWKHµ263$5&RQYHQWLRQ
.  The latter contains provisions to protect 
the marine environment and there is a regional agreement on the protection of 
VPDOOFHWDFHDQVFRQFOXGHGDVWKH³$JUHHPHQWRQWKH&RQVHrvation of Small 
&HWDFHDQVRIWKH%DOWLFDQG1RUWK6HDV´XQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRIWKH81(3
Convention on Migratory Species. 
3.4.4 Scotland has been at the forefront of the development of marine spatial 
planning and, at a UK level, the UK Marine Policy Statement under the Marine 
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and Coastal Access Act 2009 sets out an agreed framework for preparing 
Marine Plans and taking decisions affecting the marine environment.  
Continued implementation of the UK Marine Policy Statement will be 
fundamental to achieving and maintaining Good Environmental Status.  It is 
therefore key to successful transition from EU level arrangements, as defined 
in the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, to an increased significance of 
international law arrangements such as the OSPAR Convention.  
3.4.5 Because of their significance, international agreements and obligations 
in marine governance arrangements are likely to highlight any constitutional 
disagreement over responsibility for international matters.  As in other areas, 
to the extent that reliance comes to be placed on international rather than EU 
obligations, the international ones tend to be less precise and to have weaker 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms than those laid out by EU law, but 
this gap could be addressed or reduced, for example by appropriate 
transposition of international obligations into national legislation. 
3.5 Nuclear and radioactivity issues 
3.5.1 In 1956, under the UN treaty, a Statute was established creating the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  It came into force in July 1957. The UK 
was one of 56 founding signatory nations.  Based in Vienna the IAEA 
provides a range of services and has in essence membership/signatory 
requirements on the issues relating to safe non-military use of nuclear 
technology and related aspects of health, safety, security and environment as 
well as on safeguards and verification.   
3.5.2 Since 1957 the EURATOM Treaty has also provided a strongly 
connected framework for consideration of radioactivity and nuclear issues 
within the member states (MS) which are the same states over time as the 
EC/EU ones.   A range of Directives has been developed giving legal force 
and policy shape to operational requirements for safe use of radioactivity and 
handling of materials, and for the long term management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste.  The operational aspects of the Treaty are delivered by DG 
Energy of the European Commission working directly and in partnership with 
staff in EU Member States to provide advice, assessment and oversight, 
including inspections, which, together, connect to enforcement mechanisms 
under the ECJ.   
3.5.3 Many of the high hazard areas of potential environmental impact relating 
to radioactivity in Scotland are not under devolved control in important areas. 
The two generating nuclear energy stations are part of EDF Energy. The 
three civil Decommissioning Sites are under the control of the GB Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority, that reports primarily to UK Ministers, with 
parallel responsibility to Scottish Ministers for aspects of their functions in 
Scotland. The safety regulation of nuclear installations is reserved to the UK 
Authorities, and is carried out by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), a 
UK Government body. SEPA regulates radioactive wastes from nuclear 
installations, including in liquid and gaseous forms. Ministry of Defence sites 
are exempt from both statutory safety and environmental controls. Safety 
regulation is carried out by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, which is 
answerable to the Secretary of State for Defence. A parallel non-statutory 
system of environmental regulation is carried out under an agreement 
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between the MoD and SEPA. The Scottish Government has a stated policy 
intention to bring MoD sites into the framework of statutory environmental 
regulation arrangements. Other radioactivity issues concern principally the 
medical, food, geophysical and oil and gas sectors and the use and/or 
collection of particular radioactive sources and materials under controlled 
conditions.  These have all been considered preliminarily. 
3.5.4 Currently, operational control is overseen for nuclear power plants and 
hospitals, waste facilities and other users identified, using existing licensing 
arrangements by the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation, by local government 
and health bodies, by SEPA and by BEIS Offshore for the various sectors.  
Relevant aspects concerning worker safety also connect to ONR and at the 
most general level to the HSE.  The key EU directives as established in UK 
and Scots law currently governing basic safety standards and irradiation, use 
and keeping of radioactive materials as well as the storage of wastes are 
generally highly effectively governed within the UK and Scotland. 
3.5.5 In addition, independent/oversight inspections of and advice on facilities 
in Scotland are undertaken under the provisions of both IAEA and 
EURATOM, with the latter more frequent and visible. 
3.5.6 :KLOVWZHXQGHUVWDQGWKDWLWLVWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQWRUHPDLQ
a compliant IAEA member, the main issues arising under Brexit scenarios 
relate to the extent to which the UK, and therefore, Scotland remains adherent 
to the IAEA conventions, processes and requirements, and also whether this 
is a suitable and sufficient oversight and advisory mechanism for what is lost 
through leaving EURATOM.   
3.5.7 In particular and additionally, it appears that access to and networking 
with relevant international expertise, as well as the ability to attract and retain 
staffing in key roles and support services in specialist areas could be 
restricted, thus potentially compounding the already limited and increasingly 
stretched resources left to attend to monitoring, expert independent scrutiny 
and oversight and, ultimately, enforcement.  This could affect both our ability 
to identify failures and to ensure the adequate management and mitigation of 
hazards and provide sufficient public reassurance.    
3.5.8 Some kind of Associate EURATOM membership and access to services 
were this possible might have compensating advantages.  But the question 
remains as to what powers and efficacy of enforcement would exist if the UK 
chose to see this as optional.   
3.5.9 In relation to Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM)15 and 
sources in oil and gas in particular, there are several issues around coastal, 
national and international waters and how the various components of current 
law would evolve and fit.  This requires clarification.   
3.5.10 In almost all facets of the radioactivity space, strengthening of existing 
(UK and Scottish) regulators and/or establishment of dedicated UK and 
especially Scottish oversight entities may need to be considered.
                                                        
15
 NORM is generated in the form of mildly radioactive, low level waste as muds and solid 
deposits from drilling and pipework handling processes in the oil and gas industry, including 
decommissioning and requires dedicated waste management. 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Environment/waste-and-pollution/Waste-1/16293/NORM  
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3.6 Waste and Circular Economy 
3.6.1 Our initial analysis highlights that the common issues identified across 
all topics in relation to reporting and oversight functions of the Commission 
and ECJ are also of concern in waste management. 
3.6.2 Further detailed analysis is required on at least the following areas: 
definitions (including the definition of waste and the classification of 
hazardous waste), technical standards, producer responsibility, product 
standards and labelling and transfrontier shipment of waste. 
3.6.3 There is a large amount of European legislation relating to different 
aspects of waste management and a level of complexity in the existing 
domestic legislation will remain (and increase) when the legislation is rolled 
over under EU Exit legislation. It has been the ambition of UK and Scottish 
policy over many years that much of the legislative complexity associated with 
technical treatment standards (landfill, batteries, Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment, End of Life Vehicles etc.) will be removed at the 
domestic level once waste is incorporated into the integrated regulatory 
framework under the Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. 
3.6.4 Some areas related to waste management regulation are reserved such 
as the product and labelling requirements of the WEEE, Batteries and ELV 
Directives and the Transfrontier Shipment of waste. 
3.6.5 In terms of the circular economy Scotland has a particularly ambitious 
policy agenda and has historically been ahead of other member states and 
the EU in terms of thinking around the circular economy. The new legislative 
measures in the EU Circular Economy Package sets new stretching targets 
and ambitions for waste and resource management to 2030. 
3.6.6 There may be benefit in or need for considering some issues around the 
wider UK context and the issues of standards and trade.  Adapting to new 
global trade arrangements for access to markets and receipt of goods will 
likely need a revised understanding of product standards classification and 
accreditation schemes, etc. 
 
3.7 Water Environment and Flood Risk Management 
3.7.1 The implementation of the Water Framework Directive and associated 
EU legislation for water governance follows a de-centralised and regionalised 
approach. Compared to other devolved administrations, Scotland has opted 
for a highly ambitious implementation of EU commitments under the WEWS. 
3.7.2 This said, many technical specifications for the implementation of the 
Water Framework Directive throughout the EU are cooperatively developed 
through the informal, expert and stakeholder driven Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS). In this context, the European Commission plays a significant 
role in the so-called intercalibration process, through which regional and local 
interpretations and contextualisation of environmental standards are 
harmonised. The Commission facilitates this process through exchange of 
information between Member States. This institutional and regulatory link with 
WKH(8SURFHVVZLOOEHORVWDIWHUWKH8.¶VZLWKGUDZDO+RZHYHUWKH
importance of the CIS, to which SEPA has been a leading contributor, has 
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diminished over time and is not critical for the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive in Scotland. Given the extent of devolved powers in this 
matter, nothing should prevent Scotland from maintaining full regulatory 
alignment in the future if this objective was sought. 
3.7.3 Within the UK, the implications of Brexit for the future of inter-agency 
coordination and advisory groups relevant to the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive, such as UKTAG and JAGDAG, remain unclear. Yet, as 
an entirely devolved matter, Scotland will maintain fullest legislative and 
executive powers in order to pursue a largely autonomous water policy. 
3.7.4 Equally, the Floods Directive is now fully embedded in domestic 
legislation and will be delivered through a suite of strategic flood risk 
management cycles.  7KH8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8ZLOOPHDQWKDW6FRWODQGLV
unable to help shape future changes made to the reporting requirements. 
However, there are no significant gaps envisaged resulting from the UK's 
withdrawal. 
3.7.5 The points made above highlight the valuable role of knowledge 
exchange.  Given the stance adopted on water issues in Scotland thus far and 
WKH&DELQHW6HFUHWDU\¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRPDLQWDLQVWDQGDUGV6FRWODQG¶VORQJHU
term commitment to, and performance in, protecting the water environment 
and contributing to global policy and implementation, suggest a strong 
position.  There may also be opportunities to develop policy which is better 
suited to the specific Scottish water environment.  
 
3.8 Chemicals, biocides and pesticides  
3.8.1 The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) manages the technical, 
scientific and administrative aspects of the implementation of EU chemicals 
regulations which are presently implemented directly in the UK and have 
wider connection to other EU regulations enforcement achieved at national 
level.  Whilst still unclear, the 8.¶Vexit from the EU may mean that the UK will 
no longer be serviced by the European Chemicals Agency and the related EU 
law framework (REACH). This is therefore an area where present governance 
arrangements would not function. Retaining membership of ECHA, as was 
suggested by the UK Prime Minister, would be the easiest short term solution.  
This is also an area where UK businesses will need to continue to apply EU 
rules in order to sell their products in the EU marketplace. 
3.8.2 In addition to the general concerns identified in this report around 
reporting and oversight functions fulfilled by the EU Commission and the 
CJEU, there are additional issues which are particularly concerning within 
chemicals, notably a loss of influence in a commercially important global 
sector where significant companies operate in Scotland currently, capacity at 
Scotland and UK levels and the benefits of a UK framework.  
3.8.3 REACH applies to all EEA Member States. 7KH(&+$KDV³FRRSHUDWLRQ
DJUHHPHQWV´ZLWKUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHVLQ$XVWUDOLD&DQDGD-DSDQDQGWKH
USA, which focus on exchanging information and knowledge regarding the 
management of chemicals. In addition, Switzerland and Turkey have enacted 
legislation that mirrors REACH, but is developed and implemented in an 




responsibility of complying with REACH. Alternatively, the obligation for 
compliance will fall to the importer. In none of these arrangements would the 
UK have much influence. It remains to be seen whether the UK can negotiate 
an exit deal that allows it to retain any influence. 
3.8.4 The loss of influence at the EU and international level is particularly 
concerning in this area. 13% of the unique companies who registered 
chemicals under REACH in 2017 were based in the UK. The UK has been a 
significant actor in terms of registering and evaluation of substances. The 
ECHA has also highlighted the role that the UK has traditionally played by 
using its influence to support proportionality. The UK has been important in 
arguing that decisions should reflect a proportionate (balanced) approach to 
risk rather than adopting a very precautionary and risk-averse attitude. 
Scotland, nonetheless does not necessarLO\DOLJQZLWK:HVWPLQVWHU¶V
approach to risk when it is in its remit to do so.  
3.8.5 In the UK, the Chemicals Regulation Division (CRD), part of the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE), is responsible for the much of the regulations on 
chemicals and for the Competent Authority functions within EU legislation 
regulating industrial chemicals where HSE is the appointed authority for the 
UK. CRD employs around 250 scientific, policy and support staff. It is possible 
that for a new or existing authority to undertake the same workload with no 
access to the existing EU networks and system would require a substantially 
larger workforce, as well as significant start-up/extension costs in the short 
term.  Depending on the outcome of the ongoing discussions on internal 
allocation of EU powers, lack of capacity could be an issue for devolved 
administrations, as further discussed in section 4.5 below. The increase of 
staff in some Departments of the UK Government to deal with Brexit demands 
may well need to be replicated in Scotland.  
3.8.6 Within the UK, regulation of chemicals is an area where the adoption of 
a UK-wide approach, within devolved responsibilities would be desirable, as 
all industry across the UK will need to continue to comply with EU rules in 
order to sell their products on the EU marketplace. Scotland has always relied 
on UK wide expertise in the area of chemicals management. 
 
3.9 Industrial Pollution Control  
3.9.1 In our consideration of environmental media we addressed air, water 
and waste, above.  Soils and a range of other issues also interconnect with 
these media.  It is also relevant to consider integrated, cross-cutting and 
general industrial pollution issues.  These issues are largely addressed by the 
Industrial Emissions Directive (IED, 2010/75) and the precursor IPPC 
(Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control) Directives.  
3.9.2 The framework for integrated pollution prevention and control was set 
RXWLQWKH,33&'LUHFWLYHLQ7KH,33&'LUHFWLYH³33&´LQ
shorthand, has been amended and extended, focussing on wastes as well as 
processes, to become the practical centre-piece of industrial emissions 
control and materials management. The understanding of the value of 
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integration was based both on notions of administrative coherence and 
simplicity and therefore tractability for enterprise management but crucially on 
the learning that different approaches to controlling emissions or releases to 
air, water and land separately resulted in the shifting of polluting materials and 
WKHLULPSDFWVRIWHQ³ZDVWHV´between the environmental media rather than 
protecting the environment overall.  
3.9.3 PPC consolidated and incorporated a number of previous directives, 
including those relating to waste management, including the Landfill Directive, 
driving closure or retrofit of those facilities without gas and leachate collection, 
as well as air pollution and industrial process management.  PPC has now in 
turn been recast, alongside 7 other directives (on titanium oxides and their 
management and surveillance, on reducing VOCs, on waste incineration, 
IPPC 2008/1, and relating to large combustion plant) into IED. 
3.9.4 IED seeks to coordinate the authorisation and management of 
environmental permits ensuring integrated measures for air, water and land 
have been put in place. It, like PPC, is rooted firmly in the notion of Best 
Available Techniques (BAT) and the reference documents (BATRefs or 
BREFS16) for a wide range of industrial processes whereby specialists have 
brought together expert views of appropriate abatement, process control and 
operational equipment, standards, procedures and practices that will achieve 
appropriate control, energy efficient performance and management 
information for effective materials management, pollution performance 
monitoring and environment and health protection, including that of workers. 
Geographical conditions, other local loadings and the characteristics of the 
facility are also taken into account to achieve a transparent permit system. 
Emission Limit Values are also a part of this model and it is now possible to 
have a single licence that brings all the key aspects of operation and the 
releases permitted, in one document, which can then be assessed against 
actual performance on a regular basis. 
3.9.5 PPC and IED also now require elements of public consultation, via 
cross-compliance with the PPD (Public Participation Directive, 2003/35), 
ensuring greater transparency on permit conditions and performance.  
3.9.6 Collaboration on pollution prevention and control policy, practice and 
information sharing as well as legal pursuit around environmental crime 
across Europe has been another area of increased co-operation in recent 
years, between regulators and police forces as well as borders and customs 
agencies.  This has helped to address pollution risks, unfair competition, 
criminal activity generally around illegal trade and dangerous goods and has 
enhanced best practice learning between jurisdictions. 
3.9.7 The same loss of influence, networking access, data sharing and lack of 
capacity issues appear to apply in this area.  Access to BREF/BAT knowledge 
and participation in the BREF centre processes has given Scotland and the 
UK opportunities to shape and to benefit from early, authoritative and ongoing 
                                                        
16
 Permitting of IPPC/IED processes makes detailed use of BREFs. There are currently 34 
Best Available Techniques Reference Documents produced by the EU Industrial Pollution 
Prevention and Control Bureau, with extensive annexes. These are made under an exchange 
model for information gathering and assessment under the IED.  
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standards, best practice, market, technology, process and legislative 
information, insights and positions.  Loss of access has the potential to 
weaken industrial and economic development strategy, impact on 
competitiveness and trade arrangements as well as lead to a lessening of 
alignment, exchange and cooperation between regulators and policy makers. 
  
3.10 Control of Major Accident Hazards 
3.10.1 A further area which we have not covered in detail is major accident 
hazards under Directive 2012/18/EU (Seveso).  This Directive was left to the 
national authorities to implement within the EU skeleton, but there is an 
obligation on the Commission to report on the implementation and functioning 
of the scheme every four years and more significantly provision on information 
sharing between Member States and Commission (art 21).  Presumably on 
Brexit the UK will no longer be included in this system, removing the need to 
provide information but cutting us off from what is being gathered across the 
EU on this topic, including the database of major accidents which is used to 
spread information and lessons between authorities in the EU (although parts 
of this are public).  Again, there is nothing here fundamentally different in 
structure from what occurs in other areas, but it provides another example of 
a useful function organised through EU structures. 
 
3.11 Noise  
3.11.1 We have also briefly considered the EU measures on environmental 
noise. These measures were incorporated by Scottish regulations and 
represent an area where subsidiarity has been given considerable weight. 
The mapping, assessment and action plans, however, are still subject to 
reporting to the European Environment Agency. Directive 2002/49/EC 
involves some reporting directly to the Commission: therefore, infraction 
proceedings may be initiated, if inadequate measures are being taken. 
3.11.2 On specific sources of noise, there are EU standards for maximum 
noise levels and testing and approval. These are classic single market issues 
which would seem to call for a unified approach within the UK. For trade 
reasons close alignment with the EU would seem preferable to developing 
individual standards. Much EU law in this subject area has been transposed 
already into domestic law.  In common with many other areas, the significance 
of the EU environmental law is that the government is required to act on 
certain issues, has to report what it is doing and can be called to account if it 
falls short. 
 
4 Issues of Commonality Arising 
4.1 Introduction  
4.1.1 From the analysis of issues undertaken in 3, section by section, the 
group sought to identify where we found the same types of potential 
constraint.  One significant factor will be future policy choices, influenced by 
the future relationship with the EU.  As EU law develops, should Scotland 
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commit to remaining in step with EU law in this area, and if so, how?  Or, 
should Scotland weaken (or strengthen, or restructure) the provisions if, for 
instance, other parts of the UK do so?  The wider context will also be 
important in determining how cross-border issues will be addressed. 
4.1.2 On withdrawal from the EU, the UK will no longer be bound by EU law 
but will still be subject to many international law obligations relating to the 
environment.  Indeed many EU measures were introduced to implement the 
(8¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQVDQGRUWRMRLQWO\LPSOHPHQWWKRVHRILWV0HPEHU
States.   The EU is party to numerous international environmental treaties 
alongside, and sometimes in lieu of, its member states. As a matter of 
international law, the UK will remain a party to all environmental treaties it has 
ratified prior to Brexit, whether or not the EU is a party to those treaties as 
well.17 Conversely, the UK will not be a party to treaties the EU alone has 
ratified. EU environmental law often builds on and scales up obligations 
embedded in international environmental agreements, providing more 
ambitious levels of protection. EU law obligations are furthermore supported 
by an enforcement machinery which is much more vigorous than that 
supporting international law obligations. Unplugging from EU law will entail 
that, in most areas, the UK will be subjected both to lesser and less 
enforceable international environmental obligations. So while after Brexit, the 
8.¶VLQWHUQational obligations will continue to require the monitoring of 
environmental problems, as well as the reporting and implementation of 
measures to remedy these, such obligations will be less precise, subjected to 
lesser scrutiny, and devoid of the enforcement procedures which are typical of 
EU law.18 
 
4.2 Monitoring, Measuring and Reporting 
4.2.1 EU membership has provided the framework, drivers and opportunities, 
not least through legislative requirements and also through relationships, for 
the sharing of information between jurisdictions and the membership of 
groups and processes.  These have provided access to data and 
opportunities for Scotland and the UK to input to processes.  
4.2.2 One aspect of EU membership that has emerged frequently in our 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVKDVEHHQ6FRWODQG¶VFXUUHQWHQJDJHPHQWZLWKDZLGHUDQJHRI
European environmental networks and bodies with which we share data and 
knowledge.  EU bodies such as the EEA and the ECHA provide firstly a 
source of data that assists environmental bodies across the EU in carrying out 
their tasks and in assessing comparative performance, and secondly a forum 
for sharing expertise and good practice at various levels.  These also allow 
benchmarking against EU and other international performance. After 
withdrawal, Scottish bodies may be able to maintain membership of some of 
these EU bodies, but for others special arrangements will have to be made to 
enable at least some continuing involvement, and access to databases and 
other sources of information.  The position varies according to the constitution 
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of each EU body, in some cases requiring rule changes to enable participation 
by countries outside the EU or EEA.19  
4.2.3 Our review identified capacity as a cross-cutting issue.  At present, EU 
bodies provide capacity as well as access to data, best practices, etc.  In 
addition, Brexit preparation is already placing significant strain on the capacity 
of government and others to develop appropriate responses.  This demand 
will continue and grow.  We note a recent report outlining the resources made 
available for Brexit-related work in Whitehall20LQFOXGLQJQHZ³(8H[LW
UROHV´LQDEFRA. How this work is undertaken in Scotland will be a policy 
decision, but capacity to address the governance gaps identified in this report 
will be needed.   
Reporting about the environment: environmental data 
4.2.4 Gathering and comparing robust environmental data are essential to 
support evidence based policy making. On leaving the EU, the UK will still 
need to fulfil a wide range of international commitments to provide information 
and data, which are used to create international datasets in order to assess 
compliance and progress under international treaties and agreements. In 
some cases data are aggregated at EU level before transmission to wider 
international bodies such as the Secretariats of international treaty bodies. 
When the UK is outside the EU, all reports will be made directly to the 
relevant international body. However there are additional EU reporting 
requirements where the information provided is for use by the EU itself.  It 
would provide clarity if a policy commitment were given to the effect that this 
range of data gathering and reporting for various purposes and to various 
other bodies would continue, even when there is no longer a requirement to 
report to the EU.  
4.2.5 Usually data are firstly aggregated at UK level before transmission, as it 
is the UK, as party or Member State, which has the duty to report. Again it 
would be helpful to clarify which data will be aggregated at UK level to allow 
for comparisons and benchmarking after Brexit. 
4.2.6 'DWDWRIXOILOOWKH8.¶VUHSRUWLQJFRPPLWments in relation to environment 
and climate change are currently gathered through a wide range of specialist 
organisations. The actual gathering and preparation of these data, in that this 
is currently undertaken by existing bodies at Scottish or UK level through 
NDPBs21, research institutions and other parts of government, would not 
require new governance arrangements to be in place.  
4.2.7 However at present the European Union, often through agencies such 
as the European Environment Agency, provides a capacity to quality check 
and analyse data, and to provide benchmarking information, which adds value 
and applies pressure on Member States to complete reports and to improve 
the quality of these reports. This capacity will be lost unless agreement is 
reached to maintain a relationship with these bodies. Loss of access to 
comparative information across Europe and loss of access to expertise and 
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databases at European level is a common concern across the areas we have 
considered. 
4.2.8 Future information gathering and presentation at a Scottish or UK level 
can continue to be performed by the organisations that already perform this 
function. We do not see a need for a new body or functions to perform this 
role.  
Reporting about the environment: Reporting on the application of 
environmental laws 
4.2.9 Reporting on the actions taken to comply with international treaties and 
SURWRFROVFDQEHSDUWRIDFRXQWU\¶VFRPPLWPHQWVDQGZKHUHWKLVLVQHHGHG
we assume it will continue, based on current arrangements within the UK. 
However the requirements in terms of reporting on the application of EU law 
and its effect are usually more stringent.  
4.2.10 We gave some consideration to the role performed by EU, UK and 
Scots law.  Some sources of EU law set out what can or must be done 
(powers and duties) and others, including some key EU Directives are 
somewhat more focused on setting out what outcomes are required to be 
achieved.  Reporting on whether legislation is meeting its purpose as well as 
whether it is in place and being implemented are both important to 
understanding the state of, and prospects for, the environment. Reporting to 
the EU often covers not just the transmission of factual data but assessments 
of the state of implementation, compliance and progress, for example on the 
progress towards the favourable conservation status of species protected 
under the EU Habitats Directive. 
4.2.11 While it is assumed that reporting requirements contained in EU 
Directives will become part of retained EU law, they will become ownerless in 
the sense that reporting will no longer be to the European Commission. It 
would be useful to clarify the intentions as to the recipients of such reports in 
the future but we assume that in the first instance such reports as they relate 
to Scotland would be for Scottish Ministers to publish them and make them 
available to the Parliament and the public. 
4.2.12 Such reports can continue to be prepared as at present by the 
responsible public body to ensure this information is still publicly available and 
we do not see a need for any new structure. There may however be a need to 
clarify the procedures for publishing these reports in the future and a policy 
commitment to doing so would be reassuring. In the longer term, a review of 
reporting duties and procedures could help to streamline and clarify their 
purpose. If duties apply to retained EU law but not, or not equally, to domestic 
law the situation will become confused over time as legislation is amended.  
4.2.13 An important advantage of reporting in a consistent way across the EU 
is that data are (more likely to be) comparable and we can use systems and 
databases developed by specialist organisations at the European level. This 
provides useful comparators to assess our own performance and also wider 
access to data, knowledge and expertise. It has also created opportunities for 
Scottish and UK experts to increase their knowledge and influence in the 
creation of these procedures. While we expect that international collaboration 
is certain to continue, we consider that options for continued engagement with 
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and, where possible under their constitutions, membership of European 
expert bodies such as the European Environment Agency (which already 
includes non-EU members) should be actively pursued. The work of many EU 
agencies and bodies is recognised world-wide and the benefits of continued 
participation are not limited to the European continent.  
 
4.3 Scrutiny and Investigation 
Scrutiny of reports, independent assessment, examining compliance and 
progress 
4.3.1 The UK is currently subject to EU mechanisms scrutinising the 
transposition and proper implementation of EU law. When the European 
Commission receives reports from Member States it has the power, access to 
expertise and capacity to assess these and ensure that Member States are 
compliant with requirements, and it can measure progress against objectives 
and propose actions where needed. This capacity is independent of the 
Member States and will be lost on leaving the EU. When operating well these 
processes help to ensure Member States strive to fulfill their commitments but 
also provide them with valid comparators with other EU nations and validate 
the actions of those Member States that have a good record of 
implementation. The loss of this independent scrutiny of performance at a 
supranational level is one of the issues of highest concern to environmental 
NGOs in the UK, who have also canvassed public opinion on the issue. 
4.3.2 On leaving the EU there will be no comparable body or bodies 
performing these functions for Scotland. Ministerial and Parliamentary scrutiny 
DQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\EHFRPHWKHµFHLOLQJ¶ZKHQWKH(8OHYHOLVUHPRYHG
Whether there should be an independent scrutiny function is a policy decision 
and the arguments for it are essentially about openness and transparency and 
the right for citizens to be well informed about an issue of high public interest, 
to be able to access reliable information about the state of their environment 
and the performance of public bodies in relation to it and, where appropriate, 
to have their concerns addressed. 
4.3.3 Several international treaties have expert bodies tasked to analyse 
reports and provide comment on compliance and progress in the 
implementation of State obligations. However, these arrangements vary 
greatly from one treaty to the other, and generally do not provide significant 
powers to sanction instances of lack of compliance.  
4.3.4 It can be argued that there is a number of bodies in civil society such as 
academic institutions, non-governmental charitable bodies, professional and 
expert institutions who will, no matter what else is in place, undertake the 
scrutiny and analysis of environmental reports and publish their conclusions. 
Their reports could be used by Parliamentary Committees to challenge or 
question Ministers and public bodies on performance. In terms of public 
interest the main advantage of this option is it is inexpensive for the public 
purse. However it will depend on these non-JRYHUQPHQWDOERGLHV¶GHFLVLRQV
on what they think is worth examining. Also, some of these bodies will have 
policy objectives in terms of influencing public opinion and public policy, and 
WKHLUDQDO\VHVPD\EHYLHZHGE\VRPHDVSDUWRI³DQDJHQGD´,WLVWKHUHIRUH
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important that this analysis and scrutiny function is undertaken by a fully 
independent body. 
4.3.5 The functions of existing publicly funded bodies such as SEPA, ZWS 
and SNH could be expanded to give them a larger role in compiling, analysing 
and presenting reports and assessing performance and compliance. This is 
again relatively straightforward in building on existing structures but will have 
a cost in terms of increasing the capacity of these organisations. More 
significantly however, arguably, these bodies will not be seen as genuinely 
independent of government given their financial and strategic policy 
dependence on Ministers and current governance arrangements, if there is no 
higher oversight body or mechanism.  Indeed, they would on occasions have 
direct regulatory responsibility for the areas on which they are reporting, 
creating a potential conflict of interest ± RUDQDSSHDUDQFHRI³PDUNLQJWKHLU
RZQKRPHZRUN´HYHQLIWKHLUERDUGVVHUYHDVPHFKDQLVPVGHVLJQHGWR
secure a measure of independence. 
4.3.6 There are of course bodies within the public sector that are more clearly 
genuinely independent of government and have functions to examine and 
report on compliance and performance. These include roles such as those of 
the Information Commissioner, the Public Appointments Commissioner, the 
&KLOGUHQDQG<RXQJ3HRSOH¶V&RPPLVVLRQHUWKHScottish Human Rights 
Commission and Audit Scotland22. While some of these bodies have powers 
to look across government their functions are designed for quite specific 
purposes and thus while Audit Scotland has quite wide powers and scope its 
focus remains on the effective and efficient use of public money rather than 
on the achievement of policy objectives in themselves. Thus while expanding 
the role of an existing body might be simpler in some respects it is likely to 
distort the current balance of duties and require the recruitment of new 
expertise. Specialist sectoral bodies with duties to provide independent expert 
assessment in specific policy areas already exist, such as HM Inspectorates, 
the Health Improvement Service etc. 
4.3.7 The remaining option we have considered therefore is the establishment 
RIDQHZIXQFWLRQLQDERG\ZKLFKPLJKWEHFDOOHGWKHµRIILFHRIHQYLURQPHQWDO
VFUXWLQ\DQGDXGLW¶7KLVZRXOGEHDQLQGHSHQGHnt public body, able to draw 
on the expertise and knowledge of other bodies both public and private. It 
could have a core staff with sufficient expertise to quality control its findings 
and reports and provide expert judgement, but be able to commission, or 
access additional information, from other public bodies.  
4.3.8 We have not at this stage attempted to work out a detailed scope or 
remit for such a body, but besides being independent of government it would 
need powers of scrutiny and investigation and, of course, resources. The 
advantage of this solution is that it meets the concerns that have been voiced 
by environmental interest and provides potentially the most comprehensive 
solution to the likely governance gap in relation to scrutiny. The 
disadvantages are clearly that it would take time to establish and would be an 
additional cost with no obvious offsetting savings (other than time currently 
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 See http://www.parliament.scot/abouttheparliament/27110.aspx for details of the 
parliamentary commissioners and equivalents 
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taken to respond to European Commission reports and requests).23 Were this 
to be seen as a preferred option a short term solution should also be 
considered based on existing bodies, perhaps augmented by a fixed term 
µH[SHUWSDQHO¶WRFRQVLGHUDQ\UHSRUWVSURGXFHGXQWLODQ\QHZERG\ZDV
operational. 
Initiation of studies and reports 
4.3.9 The European Commission has the capacity not just to receive and 
assess reports but also to initiate ad hoc studies and reports often by 
commissioning research consultancies or bodies such as the European 
Environment Agency, the European Topic Centres, or through mechanisms 
such as Fitness Checks of specific pieces of legislation.  These studies may 
have a pre-investigative fact-finding purpose as a precursor to more explicit 
investigation.  Such a power to commission reports may need to be replicated 
after Brexit. 
4.3.10 The Scottish Government can also of course commission any studies 
or research it considers necessary to help the effective and efficient 
implementation of its environmental policies and to assess progress. However 
if the value of independent scrutiny is accepted it would seem logical that 
whichever solution is adopted to provide this, there are also appropriate 
powers to initiate as well as receive reports. This will necessitate powers to 
request information from other bodies, and if necessary to compel a response.  
Once more there are resource implications. 
 
4.4 Considering Complaints 
4.4.1 EU law currently empowers citizens to report to the European 
Commission instances of lack of compliance with EU law. The Commission 
has discretion to act upon the information received, which can ultimately lead 
to infringement proceedings before the CJEU. After EU withdrawal, this 
function will no longer exist. This is seen by environmental NGOs and experts 
(including some regulators) as having been an essential means of ensuring 
Member States take their duties seriously and acting as an incentive for the 
Member State authorities to deal with concerns and complaints before they 
reach the Commission, or before they escalate to more formal stages. The 
number of cases raised in this manner has been pointed to as an indication of 
both the value and necessity of such mechanisms. Interestingly however the 
number of complaints received by the Commission regarding environmental 
law has been declining in recent years (348 in 2016) which is hopefully an 
indication that Member States are more familiar with what is required in order 
to comply or more effective in responding to concerns at a national level. 
4.4.2 At a domestic level, citizens have a range of options to pursue concerns, 
through the complaints procedures on public bodies, through their elected 
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 As with all forms of scrutiny, one IRUPRI³VDYLQJV´WKDWZLOODULVHLVWKDWLWZLOOFDXVH
implementation/decisions subject to that scrutiny to be become/remain of a high standard ± 
and thus prevent costly appeals/challenges/compensation/restoration.  It is therefore  
possible to view this DV³SUHYHQWDWLYHVSHQG´± a short-term cost, but preventing longer term, 
larger increases in costs. 
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representatives, through the Scottish Public Sector Ombudsman or directly to 
Parliament through the Petitions procedures. Again, the remit and powers of 
existing bodies could be reviewed to provide additional capacity to receive 
and investigate complaints about lack of compliance. The potential 
weaknesses are the same as for other aspects: perceived lack of 
independence (NDPBs); current limitations on scope (SPSO24); or lack of 
specific expertise and knowledge of environmental issues. One of the 
concerns identified in our investigations is that any examination of complaints 
should be able to consider the merits of a case and not just the legality and 
procedural propriety, which would require an understanding not just of 
environmental law but of environmental science and policy. 
4.4.3 Were a new body to be established to provide scrutiny functions as 
discussed above, it should also have powers to consider and investigate 
complaints. The body should be able to exercise discretion in the exercise of 
this power to ensure the use of its resources is prioritised to the most 
significant concerns. 
4.4.4 It is also worth considering where the European Commission has a role 
in scrutinising and commenting on some proposals before the Members state 
acts, for instance in approving lists of sites intended for designation under the 
EU Habitats Directive or approving proposals to allow developments 
adversely affecting protected sites containing priority species or habitats for 
reasons of over-riding public interest. This also extends to approving 
programmes under EU funding mechanisms such as Structure Funds or the 
Common Agriculture Policy (Rural Development Programmes). We have 
assumed these decisions will be devolved matters and there will be no 
supranational decision-making body. Decisions in these kinds of area will 
therefore receive less independent scrutiny than at present and can be 
expected to be a focus of concern and potential challenge. Publication of clear 
procedures and responsibilities in these areas, possibly including the new 
body as a statutory consultee in the development of such proposals, will help 
to ensure transparency and accountability. 
 
4.5 Mechanisms to seek solutions 
4.5.1 One of the valuable functions that the European Commission performs 
at present is to engage with Member States in order to seek resolution of 
concerns and problems. At one level it seeks to avoid problems arising by 
preparing guidance based on experience. The Commission also supports 
reports of best practice and a range of professional and expert bodies and 
networks that can assist the responsible authorities in each Member State to 
address challenges and improve implementation. There are several sector 
specific procedures such as the Common Implementation Strategy for the 
Water Framework Directive that set standards and expectations and reduce 
disagreement. 
4.5.2 Beyond this, the Commission will normally engage directly in discussion 
with a Member State where it believes there may be a valid complaint and 
seek a resolution. This usually begins informally but there is also a series of 
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 Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 
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formal steps (such as the exchanges of letters and investigations, pursuant to 
the procedure under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union) before any complaints are elevated to the level of the CJEU. 
4.5.3 Were a new body to be established it would be valuable to give it a role 
in terms of supporting best practice and in seeking and negotiating solutions 
to any valid concerns on implementation to avoid undue pressure on courts 
(assuming legal challenges will be an option ± see following sections). In the 
absence of a new body it would be for the relevant public body under the 
supervision of Government and/or Parliament to decide if it wished to change 
its approach in response to complaints and taking account of the risk of 
subsequent legal challenge if it failed to do so. 
 
4.6 Powers to refer a Public body to a court 
4.6.1 At present, once the European Commission has exhausted the 
procedures to seek an agreed solution over questions of compliance with EU 
law, it can refer a case to the CJEU for judgement. These judgements are 
binding on the Member States and if not acted upon financial penalties can be 
imposed. 
4.6.2 The main current mechanism to challenge lack of or poor 
implementation of EU law in the domestic courts is judicial review, as well 
exemplified by recent litigation brought by Client Earth concerning air pollution 
levels in the UK. At present a judicial review can be brought by any legal 
entity with appropriate standing. There is not a public body charged with 
referring other public bodies to a court for their failure to properly implement 
environmental law. The current arrangements for judicial review have been 
questioned by environmental NGOs on the grounds both of their scope and 
affordability (and therefore their compliance with the Aarhus Convention); we 
note this is an area of current disagreement. 
4.6.3 The nature of many EU measures is to impose obligations on the 
government to achieve specific outcomes (e.g. a target for air or water quality 
or for recycling rates).  Traditionally judicial review proceedings concentrated 
on process and procedure. In the face of targets, such as those imposed by 
EU law, after Brexit, UK (and Scottish) courts will be called on to consider 
substantive outcomes in a way that has not been required in the past and 
which may present challenges for existing courts and their procedures.  If a 
policy decision were to be made to seek to replicate the role of the CJEU in 
domestic courts (either on reference from a scrutiny body or by direct 
application from a citizen or community), there may need to be a parallel 
review to consider the need to replicate any of the structures and procedures 
of those courts within the domestic system.  This review could consider the 
merits, or otherwise, of revising judicial review rules, the creation of an 
Environmental Court25, or other measures ± to ensure both full compliance 
with the Aarhus Convention and the need, as expressed above, to address 
outcome, scope and affordability issues. 
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 Such a court might be either a new court or an expansion of the Land Court. 
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4.6.4 Were a new body created it could have powers to refer cases to a court 
as the European Commission does at present; or it could simply report its 
findings to Parliament. In the latter instance, Parliamentary condemnation and 
criticism may be regarded as entailing sufficient sanction. Alternatively, third 
parties may be empowered to initiate legal proceedings based on the findings 
of the public body. Such third parties would however face challenges in 
establishing title to sue and cost and difficulty in establishing a substantive 
remedy that ensures environmental remediation. If new procedures to register 
and investigate complaints in the environmental sector were introduced, then 
judicial procedures would have to be co-ordinated with these. At this point we 
have not considered the implications in detail.  
 
4.7 Powers to order interim measures 
4.7.1 Although rarely seen in practice, the CJEU can require interim 
measures, for example to halt developments, until a final ruling is made. Such 
powers are replicated in domestic courts, but similarly rarely invoked, not least 
because the party winning an interim remedy is liable for the losses suffered 
by the other party if at the full hearing it is determined that the action 
interdicted was in fact legitimate. Such powers are potentially important and 
should be retained, and indeed reviewed to ensure an effective means of 
preventing serious harm.  
4.7.2 Some public bodies, such as local authorities, and NDPBs, such as 
SNH, can impose or seek temporary restrictions on developments and 
activities, usually until such time as a full assessment is made and / or subject 
to appeal. While powers could be given to a new body to halt developments, 
which are of concern, it would perhaps be more consistent if such powers 
remain with a court. Should a new body be created then it should be clear that 
it is empowered to seek such action by a court where it believes it to be 
essential. 
4.7.3 In addition, there may be a need for a Court to be empowered, on 
application, to make an order preventing the Government or a public body 
from implementing (or not implementing) a decision ± if that decision is 
subject to challenge/review.  In practice, most Governments/public bodies 
voluntarily refrain from implementation when subjected to existing 
appeal/review decisions, but it is possible that circumstances may arise where 
a petitioner for review (or the scrutiny body) may wish to seek such an order. 
 
4.8 Powers to require Ministers or a public body to comply and to 
impose sanctions 
4.8.1 The CJEU, as a supranational authority, has powers to order Member 
States to remedy failures in their application of European environmental law 
and, if this does not occur, to impose financial penalties. At the end of 2017 
the CJEU had 48 cases open where a Member State had failed to comply 
with a judgment on EU environmental law and where fines could be 
considered. Four of these were UK cases. These financial penalties to 
remedy failures in the implementation of environmental law do not exist in UK 
law, and environmental interests cannot always be directly compensated.  
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4.8.2 We envisage that political accountability through Parliament or legal 
accountability through the courts would remain the routes to hold public 
decisions takers to account. However, Parliament and the Courts need to 
have appropriate remedies available to perform this well ± it may be that, in 
some circumstances, the remedies available to the courts need to 
reviewed/widened to address issues of restoration and/or the requirement for 
Government to take specific (or any) action to deliver an outcome. 
4.8.3 Powers already exist to require restoration of environmental damage 
where specific unlawful activity has taken place (although different regimes 
contain inconsistent provisions). This does not cover damage caused by a 
regulator taking an improper decision. Further, such measures apply on a site 
specific or geographical basis. Failures that result in non-compliance on a 
wider scale, such as failure to ensure compliance with air quality standards, 
are harder to remedy. In the latter connection, the requirement to take the 
necessary action to meet the standard or target may involve government 
securing a response from many different actors. Where the law specifies 
remedial steps (such as the action plans under the air quality legislation that 
has featured in recent cases in England taken by ClientEarth), the initial steps 
to be ordered by the court are clear, but in other cases it may be difficult for a 
court to identify specific steps to be taken.  
4.8.4 The power of the CJEU to effectively tell national Governments what 
they must do and ultimately to impose fines has often been presented as an 
HIIHFWLYHGHWHUUHQWDQGWKHNH\µWKUHDW¶WKDWVHFXUHVFRPSOLDQFHDWHDUOLHU
stages even if little used in practice. 
4.8.5 There are several issues for potential consideration around the nature of 
sanctions and remedies, their visible use for appropriate ends and the 
corporate and personal dimensions of addressing failure and remedy, 
especially where it involves the use of public funds26. We are sceptical that a 
system by which public bodies, including Ministers, can be fined and the 
money recycled back into another part of the public purse would be seen as a 
good use of these funds. Nor would removing resources from environmental 
authorities help to improve their performance. Nevertheless a range of 
sanctions on public bodies found to have breached environmental duties or 
legal requirements could be considered. In other jurisdictions sanctions such 
as loss of public office are used.  We believe the key issues concern first the 
impact value of the sanction, penalty or remedy as a deterrent or 
³SXQLVKPHQW´, and secondly, the ability of a devised remedy to address the 
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 There are also issues which could be considered around compensation.  There is not 
space to address this in detail. However, Brexit will entail the loss of "Francovitch" type 
damages claims, whereby an individual can receive compensation when their individual rights 
have been infringed and they have suffered loss as a result of a failure to implement EU law. 
There have been Scots law private actions on losses suffered as a result of breaches of 
public law powers. These include breach of statutory duties, misfeaseance in public office and 
commission of another recognised civil wrong such as negligence.  It is also possible to 
attach a damages claim to a judicial review action but such claims are usually vindicatory 
rather than compensatory.  Francovitch damages have not been claimed often in the 
environmental area because of the need for the rule infringed to be intended to confer rights 
on individuals and the need for a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation 
resting with the member state and the damage sustained. 
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environmental problem identified as the cause of complaint.  The focus 
therefore should be on requiring the public body affected or the Government 
to take the remedial action that is needed and the primary issue is therefore 
environmental, even if there is a necessary public or political consequence in 
addition. 
 
4.9 Unique components and major flags of concern 
4.9.1 In general we found similar governance concerns arise across the topic 
areas considered. Two categories however are mentioned as potentially 
requiring an urgent resolution at UK level: 
- the need to review WKH8.¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIinternational agreements which 
have been signed by the EU but not separately by the UK, such as the 2013 
Minamata Convention on Mercury.  
- the need to agree how existing governance arrangements which operate on 
the basis of EU quota schemes, such as the EU ETS or the F-gases registry, 
will operate in future and we encourage the Scottish Government to continue 
to press the UK Government on this issue. 
 
5 Potential Solutions and Options 
5.1 The current European arrangements that provide supranational oversight 
for compliance with environmental legislation have been important to secure 
and to demonstrate compliance by Member States. In Scotland there are well-
established systems and procedures for holding public bodies to account for 
their performance and to provide challenge in the event that there is a 
perceived breach of legal powers and duties or a failure of performance. 
However, these are not as well developed nor as extensive as those that 
apply at EU level.  
5.2 There is therefore a valid case to consider additional measures to 
increase the levels of scrutiny and challenge that are available after leaving 
the EU (should that proceed). The arguments for this are essentially to ensure 
that levels of compliance and performance are not reduced if the levels of 
scrutiny and the availability of sanctions is reduced or removed. Maintaining 
environmental quality and standards is of significance to the entire population 
and therefore not the prerogative of any sector of society. There is therefore a 
valid case to argue that the public sector should provide a means to 
demonstrate transparently what standards are being achieved and to allow 
these to be examined and questioned effectively. 
5.3 There are options to do so within the current structures of accountability 
and responsibility in Scotland, but also an argument for adding to these 
structures to provide an additional level of independent expertise. In general 
ZHKDYHWDNHQWKHYLHZWKDWZLWKRXWWKH(8OHYHOWKHHIIHFWLYHµFHLOLQJ¶Ior 
issues around achievement of policy commitments and the effectiveness of 
actions is the Scottish Parliament and these are matters on which Parliament 
holds Government to account, and the issue is about what Parliament would 
need to be able to do so effectively. Where issues arise that are about 
implementation and compliance with law, these are primarily issues for courts. 
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While we note that a number of international agreements have their own 
mechanisms for reporting on compliance, we also note that these are limited 
in their scope and effectiveness compared with that provided by the EU. 
5.4 In the Table appended at Annex 3 we set out in general terms what some 
of the options are. In essence however for issues of monitoring and reporting 
we have not identified a strong argument for a new body, but propose that 
clear commitments about what public bodies will continue to monitor, and 
what information will be published, would help to allay concerns. At a future 
date a review of environmental reporting and monitoring may help to 
rationalise current programmes.  
5.5 For functions of scrutiny, investigation, consideration of complaints and 
seeking resolution of concerns, we present several options should it be 
concluded that these gaps require to be reduced or closed. Some of these are 
based on expanding the role of existing bodies. Where those are existing 
government environmental bodies there are questions of independence and 
objectivity. Where these are existing scrutiny bodies with independence from 
Government there are questions of expertise and whether such new duties 
would imbalance their existing functions. The question therefore arises about 
the need for a new independent scrutiny body in relation to the environment. 
Here too there is a wide range of possibilities in terms of the scope and remit 
of such a body that we have not attempted to elucidate at this point. While it is 
possible to envisage that these functions (scrutiny of reports, initiation of 
reports, receipt and investigation of complaints, seeking resolution, publication 
and transmission of findings) could be given to different bodies, there is also a 
logic in terms of developing expertise and capability of seeing them as a 
coherent set of responsibilities. 
5.6 There are also options in terms of how much expertise any body would 
require itself or whether it would have powers to draw on the expertise of 
others, and commission reports and analyses from other bodies in order to do 
its work. At one extreme the body could be an expert panel referring all 
detailed work of investigation and compilation of reports to others but acting 
as the guarantor of quality control and of independence. Otherwise there is a 
range of options that involves establishing a new statutory body or bodies with 
the appropriate functions. 
5.7 We also consider the functions that would be more appropriate for a court 
and again there are options to give roles to an existing court or to establish a 
new more specialist court or tribunal dealing with environment matters. We 
have not investigated these options in detail but highlight that to replicate the 
current EU functions it would be necessary to review current rules regarding 
the procedures for judicial review, in particular the capacity of courts to 
consider the merits of an argument and not just matters of procedure, 
rationality or legal interpretation. 
5.8 The imposition of fines or sanction, which is a power ± if rarely used ± of 
the CJEU, is often cited as the crucial backstop or incentive to ensure 
compliance. In the absence of a supranational authority it will be challenging 
to reproduce such a function at a Scottish level. The option would be to give 
the Scottish courts powers to impose sanctions on public authorities in 
situations where a failure to comply with legal environmental duties has been 
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proved. The nature of those sanctions and required remedial actions has not 
been explored ± but ideally the remedies available should focus on righting 
the environmental wrong. 
Short term / long term  
5.9 We have briefly considered the timescales for providing solutions should 
these be agreed. At present, when the nature of any transition period for 
leaving the EU is unclear we are unable to offer clear advice. However, we 
foresee that there may be a need for interim measures should a policy 
decision be taken to establish a new body given the likely lead in time to 
establishment. An interim position based on an expanded role for existing 
bodies perhaps supported by an independent supervisory panel would seem 
the most pragmatic. 
Engagement with European Institutions 
5.10 Throughout our examination of the wide range of environmental 
functions currently governed by EU law and procedures we have noted 
repeatedly the significant role of expert European bodies in helping to ensure 
not just that standards are met but that the justification of these standards, the 
means of achieving them and the sharing of best practice and benchmarking 
information are based on best available data and knowledge. Scotland has 
contributed to, and benefited from, this expertise and we recommend an 
urgent assessment of options for continuing to draw on this knowledge and 
expertise after EU withdrawal.  
UK dimension 
5.11 The policy and political context for environmental governance at the UK 
and EU level has been somewhat fluid during the preparation of this report.  
The Report was initially provided to a deadline in mid March.  We have 
endeavoured to reflect or at least note major developments between that time 
DQGWKH5HSRUW¶VFRPSOHWLRQ:HDUHQRZ0D\DZDUHWKDWWKH6HFUHWDU\
of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has announced an intention 
to consult on a proposal for a new statutory body to undertake some of the 
functions outlined above. At this point we understand the proposal is that the 
body should have authority over England and reserved UK matters. This 
could be problematic. 
5.12 While the negotiation of international agreements is a reserved matter 
their implementation, where it relates to the exercise of devolved powers, is 
QRW6KRXOGTXHVWLRQVDULVHDERXWWKH8.¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
agreement, whilst not explicitly Brexit related, it may very well require 
consideration of both reserved and devolved functions. The position of the 
four administrations is not equivalent, with the UK Government responsible for 
otherwise devolved matters in England and with a separate legal system in 
Scotland, unlike Wales. 
5.13 To some extent, the EU (which often is a co-signatory with member 
states to international agreements) has to date provided an element of 
commonality across the four UK jurisdictions.  To address this, post-Brexit, 
WKHUHKDVEHHQPXFKGHEDWHDERXWSRVVLEOH³FRPPRQIUDPHZRUNV´RI a 
variety of forms: legislative and non-legislative, jointly developed or otherwise, 
etc.).  One governance gap that will exist, post withdrawal (and subject to any 
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DJUHHPHQWRQµDOLJQPHQW¶ZLWKLQWKHZLWKGUDZDODJUHHPHQWLVKRZWRHIIHFW
where needed (e.g. in relation to international agreements or cross-border 
matters), the commonalities previously provided by the EU.  One model may 
be the Marine Policy Statement (see paragraph 3.4.1, above) which commits 
all jurisdictions to the high level policy goals of the OSPAR agreement and the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive ± but with each jurisdiction responsible 
for implementation in their areas of responsibility.  
5.14 The systems of accountability should also follow the agreed allocation of 
responsibility and therefore, where authority is devolved, the devolved 
SURFHGXUHVIRUDFFRXQWDELOLW\LQFOXGLQJLQ6FRWODQG¶VFDVHWKH6FRWWLVK
Parliament and separate Scottish legal system are the appropriate basis to 
pursue issues of compliance and performance. 
5.15 Nevertheless some issues may cut across national boundaries within the 
UK or cut across the reserved / devolved boundaries and therefore involve 
more than one, or indeed all four administrations. For example studies of 
compliance with international standards may be better undertaken on a UK 
basis for reasons of both effectiveness and efficiency. 
5.16 This does not imply by any means that the only solution would be a UK 
body. Indeed having a Scottish body with a thorough understanding of 
Scottish law, procedures and systems would be more focused on the issues 
that are most significant in a Scottish context. Scotland is of a scale at which 
we can envisage a separate body being justifiable and effective. However, we 
suggest that consideration be given to how arrangements might best work 
across the UK to allow collaboration, comparisons, efficient use of expertise 
and promotion of best practice.  
5.17 If all four administrations conclude that a new statutory public body is the 
best solution, this could be achieved by several different routes, including: 
- a single UK legal body but with strongly devolved elements accountable 
separately in the four administrations.  
- four separate national bodies that are required to co-operate and work jointly 
on some aspects 
- four separate bodies that between them establish a co-owned unit or 
function to consider UK wide aspects of compliance 
5.18 Finding the best solution will require all four administrations to work 
jointly to secure the best balance, respecting the devolution settlement and 
allocation of authority. 
 
6 Recommendations for Future Work  
6.1 This has been a brief, focused and quickly delivered project with 
significant dedicated time and expertise used.  Nonetheless we were only 
able to do so much in the time available and although members gave their 
time generously, there were several areas where we had insufficient 
information or access to relevant inputs and other practical limitations on our 
consideration.   
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6.2 Several areas, especially where policy and governance concerns 
coincide, require or would benefit from further research and consideration with 
expert input. We are happy, if needed to explore this and offer further views 
were this desired and helpful. 
6.3 The Group considers that it would also be helpful to examine international 
examples such as the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment in 
New Zealand and the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, as well as 
the current Commissioner for Sustainable Development in Victoria State, 
Australia and the former Sustainable Development Commissioner in Canada. 
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 Several overseas jurisdictions, including those with devolved/federal 
arrangements, have also established (Land, Resources, and) Environmental 
Courts or Tribunals. Whilst recognising the different constitutional settings and 
powers etc., these may prove instructive is suggesting possible approaches 
DSSOLFDEOHWR6FRWODQG¶VVLWXDWLRQ 
6.4 Should a decision to be taken to establish a new body (or bodies) then the 




7.1 This paper has identified a number of functions, notably in reporting, 
monitoring and enforcement, that are carried out through the EU machinery 
EXWZLOOEHORVWRQWKH8.¶VZLWKGUDZDO7KHVHDUHLPSRUWDQWIRUJRRG
governance in terms of transparency and accountability and for the proper 
functioning of Scottish authorities in fulfilling their environmental 
responsibilities.  In deciding how, if at all, these should be replaced, some 
design issues arise.  These do not require the same solution in every case 
and interim measures may be appropriate whilst more enduring arrangements 
are put in place: 
- the functions could be conferred on a ministerial advisory body, on a 
parliamentary body, or on existing bodies given expanded remits, or on a new 
body; 
- to be effective and achieve public confidence, any such body must have 
independence from government and the regulatory bodies, must have the 
expertise and capacity to do its work, must have a guarantee of the resources 
necessary for its role and must have the powers required to fulfil its tasks; 
- there must be effective ways for citizens (or national/local associations of 
citizens) to hold the government and other authorities to account for failing to 
meet their commitments and obligations, but these can focus on public 
reporting, parliamentary accountability or reference to the courts (which in turn 
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to the European Court of Justice (CJEU). The UK will also no longer be 
subject to the oversight, monitoring and reporting functions of the European 
Commission. 
 
In terms of environmental oversight, the functions of these bodies have played 
an important role in ensuring the effective and consistent implementation of 
environmental legislation and the maintenance of environmental standards 
across the EU. 
 
The Scottish Government is committed to maintaining and where appropriate 
enhancing current environmental standards and protection.  Regulatory 
structures necessary to implement and enforce environmental standards in 
Scotland are already in place and working well.  Requirements are currently 
being met either by Scottish institutions (for example the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency) or through the current UK regulatory regime (for example 
WKH+HDOWKDQG6DIHW\([HFXWLYH5HJDUGOHVVRIWKH8.¶VIXWXUHUHODWLRQVKLS
with Europe, the Scottish Government and its agencies will continue to 
monitor and enforce environmental legislation, as we currently do under 
existing domestic powers.  
 
Purpose 
It is important that the public can feel confident that environmental legislation 
will continue to be effectively and consistently implemented and that 
environmental standards will continue to being upheld.  It is also important 
that the public are confident that they can access accurate information on the 
level of achievement of such implementation and standards.  Such 
information is also likely to be necessary to demonstrate our contribution to 
the fulfilment of international obligations through treaties and agreements.   
 
$VSDUWRIWKHSURFHVVRISUHSDULQJIRUWKH8.¶VSRVVLEOHH[LWIURPWKH(8WKH
Scottish Government is carefully considering whether any gaps could arise in 
existing domestic monitoring and enforcement powers that would need to be 
addressed to ensure Scotland maintains high standards of environmental 
protection. 
 
Any new arrangements, if needed, should be designed to fit Scottish 
circumstances and current processes for monitoring, reporting and lines of 
accountability within Scotland and at the international level.  Within Scotland, 
these should include existing statutory duties and current and potential future 
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levels of parliamentary scrutiny (including the public petitions procedures) and 
the judicial process (such as access to judicial review) and should take 
account of existing functions such as those of the Public Sector Ombudsman, 
Audit Scotland and the Information Commissioner. 
 
Recommendations should take account of both marine and terrestrial 
environments and any differences in governance regimes between the two. 
 
The ask 
The Roundtable are, therefore, asked to consider and provide advice in 
response to the following questions: 
1. What potential gaps may arise, if any, in existing powers to monitor and 
enforce environmental standards in Scotland, should the UK exit the 
EU on terms which result in the loss of oversight of the CJEU and the 
European Commission? 
2. Where gaps are identified, what options are there for providing 
appropriate levels of scrutiny, reporting and accountability in Scotland 
on environmental matters? 
 
For each option proposed, please identify: 
a. The international comparators that have been considered in developing 
the option; 
b. Any adjustments that would be required to the powers and functions of 
existing bodies to address identified gaps; 
c. If any options have been identified that cannot be implemented through 
changes to the powers and functions of existing bodies and a new 
body is proposed, please set out clearly its proposed scope and 
powers; and 
d. The way in which arrangements within the option proposed at a 
Scottish level might relate to the fulfilment of international 
commitments. 
 
Outputs and timescales 
The Round Table are asked to provide a written report on these matters by 17 
March. This report will initially be treated as advice to Ministers but the Round 
Table should expect that it will be published when Ministers have had the 
opportunity to consider it and agree a way forward. 
 
The Round Table may be asked for oral updates and are welcome to provide 
interim comments or advice at any stage. 
 
Arrangements 
The Round Table may choose to progress this work through establishing a 
sub-group and may wish to consider co-opting individuals to provide 
additional expertise. The names of any individuals proposed for co-option 
should be discussed and agreed with Scottish Government. Ian Jardine will 
act as the main contact point within Scottish Government and would be happy 
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What is left after 
leaving the EU ? 
Relevant existing 
arrangements if we 
leave the EU 







data (State of the 
Environment) 
The UK will still be 
required to report under 
a range of international 
agreements and 
conventions. Where this 
is currently done through 
the EU, the UK will need 
to do this on its own. 
Public bodies will 
continue to have a range 
of monitoring and 
reporting duties. As a 
matter of policy, and in 
some cases legal 
requirement, Ministers 
and other public 
Where the UK provides 
reports directly to 
international bodies other 
than the EU, this will 
continue.  Much of the 
information is already 
gathered and co-
ordinated at UK level 
through NDPBs, 
research bodies and 
other parts of 
government.  
Being able to use EU 
systems to facilitate 
reporting and be part of 
developing 
methodologies. 
Ability to aggregate data 
at European level and 
assess UK progress and 
contribution on a 
comparative basis. 
Access to wider 
expertise, systems  and 
data and knowledge 
holdings. 
Potential loss of 
Seek continued 
engagement with 
appropriate EU expert 
institutions (such as the 
European Environment 
Agency, EURATOM, 
ECHA, IMPEL etc). 
Longer term, a review of 
monitoring and reporting 
duties across the sector 
could help to clarify, 
simplify and improve 
transparency about what 
is collected and 
published, by whom and 
for what purpose. (May 
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authorities may wish to 
publish environmental 
information presently 
reported to the EU. 
requirements for data to 
be published (depending 
on EU withdrawal 
legislation). 
need legislation to adjust 
duties). 
A single body (existing or 
new) could be given an 
overarching role in 
assessing and reporting 
on data about the state 




Reporting on the 
implementation of 
environment law 
(Is the law in 
place and 
working?) 
The UK will no longer be 
required to report to the 
European Commission 
on the implementation 
and effectiveness of 
applying environmental 
laws. There are existing 
duties at Scottish level to 
report on implementation 
(e.g. Section of the 
Regulatory Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2014. 
Continuing to publish 
other information 
currently sent to the EU 
will be a matter of policy 
Much of this information 
is already gathered and 
co-ordinated at UK level 
through NDPBs, 
research bodies and 
other parts of 
government.  
There will continue to be 
Parliamentary scrutiny of 
legislation. It is 




Committees to find time 
to fulfill this role fully. 
As above, plus: 
Loss of EU pressure to 
improve quality and 
timeliness of reporting. 
Sufficient capacity and 
expertise to scrutinise 
the effectiveness of 
existing legislation. 
Policy commitment or 
legal obligation to 
continue to prepare and 
















The UK will no longer be  
subject to EU 
mechanisms scrutinising 
the transposition and 
proper implementation of 
EU law. 
Without a supranational 
structure, scrutiny will be 
for civil society and the 
Scottish Parliament. 
 
A number of bodies 
within Scotland in both 
the public sector and civil 
society have a role in 
scrutinising 
environmental 
performance, not least 
the Parliament itself 
usually through its 
committees. Bodies such 




EU mechanisms provide 
a strong external check 
RQD0HPEHU6WDWH¶V
performance in fulfilling 
environmental 
obligations. 
It could be left largely to 
civil society, through 
academic and research 
bodies, NGOs, 
professional and expert 
bodies to scrutinise and 
comment on 
performance and these 
could be used by 
Parliamentary 
Committees to challenge 
Ministers. 
Ministers could establish 
an expert panel to 
provide additional and 
cross-cutting advice. 
The powers of NDPBs, 
such as SEPA and SNH, 
could be expanded to 
give them a more explicit 






this raises issues about 
who scrutinises their own 
regulatory performance. 
Existing public bodies 
which already have a 
role in scrutinising and 
reporting on 
performance, such as 
Audit Scotland could be 
given additional duties in 
relation to the 
environment. This raises 
questions about 
expertise and the overall 
EDODQFHRIVXFKDERG\¶V
remit. 
A new independent 












Many bodies have 
powers and capacity to 
conduct studies and 
investigations as part of 
their wider functions in 
presenting and analysing 
information on 
performance and which 
can be used in calling the 
public sector to account. 
Similarly the Parliament 
can conduct inquiries on 
its own initiative. 
As with the last section 
many bodies both in the 
public sector, academic 
world and civil society 
can and no doubt will 
undertake such work.  
The Parliament and 
bodies such as Audit 
Scotland can conduct 
inquiries into 
performance. 
Reports arise in an ad 
hoc and unsystematic 
way. The status (and 
independence / 
objectivity) of such 
studies is variable and 
Government may not be 
required or obliged to 
respond in the way they 
are when the European 
Commission are the 
instigators. To fill the EU 
role, a body or bodies 
would need powers to 
initiate investigations, 
obtain information and 
require a response. 
The task of initiating 
investigations, obtaining 
information and requiring 
a response, could be 
attributed to one of the 
bodies indicated above. 
However, if a power to 
require the provision of 
information is needed 
with penalties for failing 
to do so ± which seems 
likely ± this could only be 










Citizens will retain 
general rights to register 
a complaint and to 
challenge the actions of 
Government and public 
bodies. 
There are mechanisms 
for individuals and 
organisations to 
complain about the 
delivery activities of 
environmental authorities 
to those authorities, 
through their elected 
Elected representatives 
may require expert and 
independent advice in 
order to reach 
conclusions on 
environmental matters 
and in order to pursue 
complaints with 
Additional powers could 
be given to an existing 
body to consider 
complaints from the 
public and to require 
compliance from public 
authorities. 
However, none of the 
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law representatives , 
including the petitioning 
of Parliament or to the 
Scottish Public Sector 
Ombudsman (SPSO).  
Government.  
Ombudsmen are not 
specifically focused on 
environmental issues 
and may not have the 
technical expertise for 
complex environmental 
issues. 
Exiting mechanisms (e.g. 
ombudsman) tend to be 
focused an assessing 
whether proper and legal 
process has been 
followed rather than on 
the merits of any 
complaint. 
existing bodies possess 
both the expertise and 
independence to 
consider complaints as to 
whether intended 
environmental outcomes 
are being achieved. 
A new body could be 
created either to report to 
Parliament directly or to 
advise a body such as 
SPSO with an expanded 
remit. This body would 
also require powers to 
require a response or 



















Public bodies will 
continue to be required 
to have established 
complaints procedures 
which also include 
commitments to fully 
investigate and respond 
to complaints about their 
performance. This 
response often involved 
seeking a resolution. 
 
Government itself, with 
the engagement of 
Parliament, will often 
seek to resolve public 
concerns. 
Bodies such as the 
Parliamentary 
Committees have powers 
of investigation and to 
obtain information. The 
Ombudsman can only 
exercise these powers 
where certain conditions 
around the complaints 
are met, but does not 
usually seek a solution 
through negotiation, 
although it will 
recommend changes to 
procedure and practice.  
There is no current body 
charged explicitly with 
seeking to resolve issues 
of compliance and to 
pursue remedies in the 
way the European 
Commission currently 
does. 
Many issues raised with 
the European 
Commission (through 
monitoring or complaints) 
are resolved quickly and 
informally, but influenced 
by the pressure of more 
formal processes in the 
background.  
This role can be added to 
the remit of whichever 
body is charged with 
investigating questions of 
compliance.  See above. 
Alternatively, existing 
bodies could be left with 
the monitoring roles and 
can receive complaints  
to another body to seek 
resolution of compliance 
issues. 
Powers to refer a 
public body  to a 




law in order to 
There is an existing legal 
framework covering 
judicial review, appeals 
and other civil action.  
There are a number of 
Scots private law actions 
There are a number of 
public and private law 
actions that individuals 
can take where public 
bodies are not complying 
with the law, which would 
There is no body 
specifically charged with 
referring a public body to 
court where there is 
evidence that the body 
has failed to fulfill its 
duties on the 
It would be possible to 
rely on existing 
mechanisms of judicial 
review but this would 
mean a re-consideration 
of their scope.  
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seek a remedy that deal with the 
situation where loss has 
been suffered as a result 
of breaches of public law 
powers. These include 
breach of statutory 
duties, misfeaseance in 
public office and 
commission of another 
recognised civil wrong 
such as negligence.  It is 
also possible to attach a 
damages claim to a 
judicial review action but 
such claims are usually 
vindicatory rather than 
compensatory. 
 
apply to retained EU law.   
The main current 
mechanism is judicial 
review which is based 
only on a challenge to 
the legality or 
reasonableness of an 
action by a public body.  
 
 
environment, or failed to 
deliver an outcome 
commitment.  
Existing rules on 
standing and costs may 
deter private parties and 
NGOs from pursuing 
judicial review. 
Scots law remedies do 
not have the same scope 
as those provided by EU 
law. The nature of many 
EU obligations in 
requiring the strict 
achievement of 
standards and targets 
would, if replicated, 
require the courts to pay 
more attention to 
substantive outcomes 
rather than process and 
procedure. 
 
However, a reference to 
court should be a final 
recourse when all other 
methods of enforcement 
have failed. It is hard to 
envisage that an existing 
public body such as 
SEPA or SNH could refer 
itself to a court. However, 
if a new public authority 
is created, evidence of a 
failure on the part of 
another public body 
could be submitted or 
referred to a court as an 
option of last resort. 
The issues of whether it 
is appropriate for the 
judicial system to 
consider issues of 
outcome/merit rather 
than process and 
procedure, and whether 
there would be relevant 
expertise and capacity 
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would need to be 
explored further. This 
could include 
consideration as to 
whether an 
environmental court or 
tribunal should be 
established.  







Courts and public bodies 
have a range of interim 
powers to stop activities 
that breach 
environmental laws, 
normally subject to 
appeal. 
Courts can grant interim 
interdict to halt 
developments until a full 
judgment is reached.  
There is some concern 
that  these may be rarely 
invoked because the 
party seeking this may 
be liable for the losses 
suffered by the other part 
if the contested 
action/decision which 
has been stopped is held 
at the full hearing to be 
lawful. 
There are powers 
Although current powers 
to issue interim 
measures will continue, 
this is a widely 
recognised area of 
weakness.  
The CJEU has in 
principle provided a 
backstop where Member 
states appear to have 
breached EU law but in 
practice its powers have 
been rarely exercised. 
The range of powers 
within regulatory 
schemes to suspend 
decisions/action could be 
reviewed, as could the 
procedures in the courts 
to ensure that there are 
practical and effective 
means of intervention 
pending the final 
resolution of cases, and 
of securing remedies 
where required. 
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available to public bodies 
to halt harmful activities 
such as Nature 
Conservation Orders and 
Land Management 
Orders  which are usually 
open to an appeal 
process. 
Powers to require 
Government to 
take such action 
as is necessary to 




action is not 
taken (including 
fines)  
On leaving the EU, no 
equivalent to the role 
exercised by the CJEU 
will apply. 
Courts can quash 
decisions in certain 
circumstances and grant 
financial compensation 
where there is an 
identifiable loss to a 
private interest.  
The appropriate 
remedies, beyond 
declarator, are less clear 
where the finding is that 
the government has, for 
example, failed to meet 
broader air or water 
quality targets. 
The powers of Scottish 
Courts are more limited 
than those of CJEU and 
public interests such as 
the environment are not 
compensated.  
Political and policy 
accountability through 
Parliament or legal 
accountability through 
the courts would remain 
the main routes to 
sanction government. 
Should a body within 
Scotland be given 
powers to impose 
sanctions (or seek 
sanctions via a court), 
the nature of these 






However, there is limited 
merit in one public body 
issuing financial 
sanctions against 
another, as this 
essentially limits 
resources of government 
or NDPBs to carrying out 
functions and otherwise 
ensuring compliance with 
environmental law. Thus, 
the sanctions available 
must be environmentally-
focused ± that is, an 
order to take or quash a 




w w w . g o v . s c o t
© Crown copyright 2018
This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except 
where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-
government-licence/version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National 
Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk.
Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to 
obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.
This publication is available at www.gov.scot 





ISBN: 978-1-78851-953-3 (web only)
Published by The Scottish Government, May 2018
Produced for The Scottish Government by APS Group Scotland, 21 Tennant Street, Edinburgh EH6 5NA
PPDAS423406 (05/18)
